For objective causal inference, design trumps analysis by Rubin, Donald B.
ar
X
iv
:0
81
1.
16
40
v1
  [
sta
t.A
P]
  1
1 N
ov
 20
08
The Annals of Applied Statistics
2008, Vol. 2, No. 3, 808–840
DOI: 10.1214/08-AOAS187
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2008
FOR OBJECTIVE CAUSAL INFERENCE,
DESIGN TRUMPS ANALYSIS1
By Donald B. Rubin
Harvard University
For obtaining causal inferences that are objective, and therefore
have the best chance of revealing scientific truths, carefully designed
and executed randomized experiments are generally considered to be
the gold standard. Observational studies, in contrast, are generally
fraught with problems that compromise any claim for objectivity of
the resulting causal inferences. The thesis here is that observational
studies have to be carefully designed to approximate randomized ex-
periments, in particular, without examining any final outcome data.
Often a candidate data set will have to be rejected as inadequate be-
cause of lack of data on key covariates, or because of lack of overlap
in the distributions of key covariates between treatment and control
groups, often revealed by careful propensity score analyses. Some-
times the template for the approximating randomized experiment
will have to be altered, and the use of principal stratification can be
helpful in doing this. These issues are discussed and illustrated using
the framework of potential outcomes to define causal effects, which
greatly clarifies critical issues.
1. Randomized experiments versus observational studies.
1.1. Historical dichotomy between randomized and nonrandomized stud-
ies for causal effects. For may years, causal inference based on randomized
experiments, as described, for example, in classic texts by Fisher (1935),
Kempthorne (1952), Cochran and Cox (1950) and Cox (1958), was an en-
tirely distinct endeavor than causal inference based on observational data
sets, described, for example, in texts by Blalock (1964), Kenny (1979),
Campbell and Stanley (1963), Cook and Campbell (1979), Rothman (1986),
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Lilienfeld and Lilienfeld (1976), Maddala (1977) and Cochran (1983). This
began to change in the 1970’s when the use of potential outcomes, commonly
used in the context of randomized experiments to define causal effects since
Neyman (1923), was used to define causal effects in both randomized exper-
iments and observational studies [Rubin (1974)]. This allowed the definition
of assignment mechanisms [Rubin (1975)], with randomized experiments as
special cases, thereby allowing both types of studies for causal effects to be
considered within a common framework sometimes called the Rubin Causal
Model [RCM–Holland (1986)]. In particular, the same underlying principles
can be used to design both types of studies, and the thesis of this article is
that for objective causal inference, those principles must be used.
1.2. The appeal of randomized experiments for estimating causal effects.
For many years, most researchers have agreed that for drawing inferences
about causal effects, classical randomized experiments, when feasible, are
preferable to other methods [e.g., Cochran (1965)]. However, randomized
experiments can be infeasible for a variety of ethical and other practical
considerations, and the length of time we may have to wait for their answers
can be too long to be helpful for impending decisions. Nevertheless, the
possibility of conducting a randomized experiment should still be considered
whenever a causal question arises, a point also made by Cochran (1965),
which he attributed to earlier work by Dorn (1953).
Among the well-known reasons for this admiration for randomized ex-
periments is the objectivity of the decisions for treatment assignment—the
decision rules are explicit with a probability strictly between zero and one
that each experimental unit will be exposed to either the treatment or con-
trol condition (for simplicity of exposition, this article will deal with the case
of only two experimental conditions or exposures, called generically “treat-
ment” and “control”). These unit-level probabilities, or propensity scores
[Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)], are known from the design of the experi-
ment, and are all that are needed to obtain unbiased estimates of average
treatment effects (i.e., the average effect of the treatment relative to control
across all units). This unbiasedness property is suggestive of the powerful
role that propensity scores play in causal effect estimation, even though
unbiasedness is not an essential, or even always desirable, property of esti-
mators.
Another reason why randomized experiments are so appealing, a rea-
son, that is, of course not really distinct from their objectivity, is that they
achieve, in expectation, “balance” on all pre-treatment-assignment variables
(i.e., covariates), both measured and unmeasured. Balance here means that
within well-defined subgroups of treatment and control units, the distribu-
tions of covariates differ only randomly between the treatment and control
units.
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A third feature of randomized experiments is that they are automatically
designed without access to any outcome data of any kind; again, a feature
not entirely distinct from the previous reasons. In this sense, randomized
experiments are “prospective.” When implemented according to a proper
protocol, there is no way to obtain an answer that systematically favors
treatment over control, or vice versa.
The theme of this article is that many of the appealing features of random-
ized experiments can and should be duplicated when designing observational
comparative studies, that is, nonrandomized studies whose purpose is to ob-
tain, as closely as possible, the same answer that would have been obtained
in a randomized experiment comparing the same analogous treatment and
control conditions in the same population. In this process of design, the
usual models relating observed final outcome data to observed covariates
and treatment indicators play no part, just as they do not in the design of
a randomized experiment. The only models that are used relate treatment
indicators to observed covariates.
1.3. Observational studies as approximations of randomized experiments.
All statistical studies for causal effects are seeking the same type of answer,
and real world randomized experiments and comparative observational stud-
ies do not form a dichotomy, but rather are on a continuum, from well-suited
for drawing causal inferences to poorly suited. For example, a randomized
experiment with medical patients in which 90% of them do not comply with
their assignments and there are many unintended missing values due to
patient dropout is quite possibly less likely to lead to correct inferences for
causal inferences than a carefully conducted observational study with similar
patients, with many covariates recorded that are relevant to well-understood
reasons for the assignment of treatment versus control conditions, and with
no unintended missing values.
The underlying theoretical perspective for the approach taken here was
called the “Rubin Causal Model (RCM)” by Holland (1986) for a sequence
of papers written in the 1970s [Rubin (1974, 1975, 1976a, 1977, 1978, 1979a,
1980)]. The RCM can be seen as having two essential parts, together called
the “potential outcomes with assignment mechanism” perspective [Rubin
(1990a), page 476], and a third optional part, which involves extensions to
include Bayesian inference, only briefly mentioned here because our focus is
on design, not analysis.
The first part of the RCM is conceptual, and it defines causal effects as
comparisons of “potential outcomes” (defined in Section 2) under different
treatment conditions on a common set of units. It is critical that this first
part be carefully articulated if causal inferences are to provide meaningful
guidance for practice. The second part concerns the explicit consideration
of an “assignment mechanism.” The assignment mechanism describes the
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process that led to some units being exposed to the treatment condition
and other units being exposed to the control condition. The careful descrip-
tion and implementation of these two “design” steps is absolutely essential
for drawing objective inferences for causal effects in practice, whether in
randomized experiments or observational studies, yet the steps are often ef-
fectively ignored in observational studies relative to details of the methods
of analysis for causal effects. One of the reasons for this misplaced empha-
sis may be that the importance of design in practice is often difficult to
convey in the context of technical statistical articles, and, as is common in
many academic fields, technical dexterity can be more valued than practical
wisdom.
This article is an attempt to refocus workers in observational studies on
the importance of design, where by “design” I mean all contemplating, col-
lecting, organizing, and analyzing of data that takes place prior to seeing any
outcome data. Thus, for example, design includes conceptualization of the
study and analyses of covariate data used to create matched treated-control
samples or to create subclasses, each with similar covariate distributions
for the treated and control subsamples, as well as the specification of the
primary analysis plan for the outcome data. However, any analysis that re-
quires final outcome data to implement is not part of design. The same point
has been emphasized in Rubin (2002, 2007) and the subsequent editorial by
D’Agostino and D’Agostino (2007).
A brief review of the two essential parts of the RCM will be given in Sec-
tion 2, which introduces terminology and notation; an encyclopedia entry
review is given by Imbens and Rubin (2008a), a chapter length review is in
Rubin (2008), and a full-length text from this perspective is Imbens and Rubin
(2008b). Section 3 focuses on the assignment mechanism, the real or hypo-
thetical rule used to assign treatments to the units, and on the importance
of trying to reconstruct the hypothetical randomized experiment that led to
the observed data, this reconstruction being conducted without examining
any final outcome data in that observational data set.
Then Section 4 illustrates the design of an observational study using
propensity scores and subclassification, first in the context of a classic single-
covariate example from Cochran (1968) with one background covariate. Sec-
tion 4 goes on to explain how propensity score methods allow the design of
observational studies to be extended to cases with many covariates, first
with an example comparing treatments for breast cancer to illustrate how
this extension can be applied, and second, with a marketing example to il-
lustrate the kind of balance on observed covariates that can be achieved in
practice. Section 5 uses a Karolinska Institute example to illustrate a differ-
ent point: that the same observational data set may be used to support two
(or more) different templates for underlying randomized experiments, and
one that may be far more plausible than the other. The concluding Section
6 briefly summarizes major points.
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2. Brief review of the parts of the RCM relevant to design.
2.1. Part one: units, treatments, potential outcomes. Three basic con-
cepts are used to define causal effects in the RCM. A unit is a physical ob-
ject, for example, a patient, at a particular place and point in time, say, time
t. A treatment is an action or intervention that can be initiated or withheld
from that unit at t (e.g., an anti-hypertensive drug, a job-training program);
if the active treatment is withheld, we will say that the unit has been ex-
posed to the control treatment. Associated with that unit are two potential
outcomes at a future point in time, say, t∗ > t: the value of some outcome
measurements Y (e.g., cholesterol level, income, possibly vector valued with
more than one component) if the active treatment is given at t, Y (1), and
the value of Y at the same future point in time if the control treatment is
given at t, Y (0). The causal effect of the treatment on that unit is defined
to be the comparison of the treatment and control potential outcomes at
t∗ (e.g., their difference, their ratio, the ratio of their squares). The times
t can vary from unit to unit in a population of N units, but typically the
intervals, t∗ − t, are essentially constant across the N units.
The full set of potential outcomes comprises all values of the outcome Y
that could be observed in some real or hypothetical experiment comparing
the active treatment to the control treatment in a population of N units.
Under the “Stable Unit-Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)” [Rubin
(1980, 1990a)], the full set of potential outcomes for two treatments and the
population of N units can be represented by an array with N rows, one for
each unit, and two “super” columns, one for Y (0) and one for Y (1), “super”
in the sense that Y can be multi-component. The fundamental problem fac-
ing causal inference [Holland (1986); Rubin (1978), Section 2.4] is that for
the ith unit, only one of the potential outcomes for each unit, either Y (0) or
Y (1), can ever be observed. In contrast to outcome variables, covariates are
variables, X , that for each unit take the same value no matter which treat-
ment is applied to the unit, such as quantities determined (e.g., measured)
before treatments are assigned (e.g., age, pre-treatment blood pressure or
pre-treatment education). The values of all these variables under SUTVA
is the N row array, [X,Y (0), Y (1)], which is the object of causal inference
called “the science.”
A causal effect is, by definition, a comparison of treatment and control
potential outcomes on a common set of units; for example, the average Y (1)
minus the average Y (0) across all units, or the median log Y (1) verses the
median log Y (0) for those units who are female between 31 and 35 years
old, as indicated by their X values, or the median [logY (1)− logY (0)] for
those units whose Y (0) and Y (1) values are both positive. It is critically
important in practice to keep this definition firmly in mind.
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This first part of the RCM is conceptual and can, and typically should,
be conducted before seeing any data, especially before seeing any outcome
data. It forces the conceptualization of causal questions in terms of real or
hypothetical manipulations: “No causation without manipulation” [Rubin
(1975)]. The formal use of potential outcomes to define unit-level causal ef-
fects is due to Neyman in 1923 [Rubin (1990a)] in the context of randomized
experiments, and was a marvelously clarifying contribution. But evidently
this notation was not formally extended to nonrandomized settings until
Rubin (1974), as discussed in Rubin (1990a, 2005) and Imbens and Rubin
(2008a, 2008b).
The intuitive idea behind the use of potential outcomes to define causal
effects must be very old. Nevertheless, in the context of nonrandomized ob-
servational studies, prior to 1974 everyone appeared to use the “observed
outcome” notation when discussing “formal” causal inference. More explic-
itly, letting W be the column vector indicating the treatment assignments
for the units (Wi = 1 if treated, Wi = 0 if control), the observed outcome
notation replaces the array of potential outcomes [Y (0), Y (1)] with Yobs,
where the ith component of Yobs is
Yobs,i =WiYi(1) + (1−Wi)Yi(0).(2.1)
The observed outcome notation is inadequate in general, and can lead to se-
rious errors—see, for example, the discussions in Holland and Rubin (1983)
on Lord’s paradox, and in Rubin (2005), where errors are explicated that
Fisher made because (I believe) he eschewed the potential outcome notation.
The essential problem with Yobs is that it mixes up the science [i.e., Y (0)
and Y (1)] with what is done to learn about the science via the assignment
of treatment conditions to the units (i.e., Wi).
2.2. Part 2: the assignment mechanism. The second part of the RCM is
the formulation, or positing, of an assignment mechanism, which describes
the reasons for the missing and observed values of Y (0) and Y (1) through
a probability model for W given the science:
Pr(W |X,Y (0), Y (1)).(2.2)
Although this general formulation, with the possible dependence of assign-
ments on the yet to be observed potential outcomes, arose first in Rubin
(1975), special cases were much discussed prior to that. For example, ran-
domized experiments [Neyman (1923, 1990), Fisher (1925)] are “uncon-
founded” [Rubin (1990b)],
Pr(W |X,Y (0), Y (1)) = Pr(W |X),(2.3)
and they are “probabilistic” in the sense that their unit level probabilities,
or propensity scores −ei, are bounded between 0 and 1:
0< ei < 1,(2.4)
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where
ei ≡ Pr(Wi = 1|Xi).(2.5)
When the assignment mechanism is both probabilistic [(2.4) and (2.5)] and
unconfounded (2.3), then for all assignments W that have positive proba-
bility, the assignment mechanism generally can be written as proportional
to the product of the unit level propensity scores, which emphasizes the
importance of propensity scores in design:
Pr(W |X,Y (0), Y (1))∝
N∏
i=1
ei or = 0.(2.6)
The collection of propensity scores defined by (2.5) is the most basic in-
gredient of an unconfounded assignment mechanism because of (2.6), and
its use for objectively designing observational studies will be developed and
illustrated here, primarily in Section 4, but also in the context of a more
complex design discussed in Section 5.
The term “propensity scores” was coined in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
where an assignment mechanism satisfying (2.4) and (2.5) is called “strongly
ignorable,” a stronger version of “ignorable” assignment mechanisms, coined
in Rubin (1976a, 1978), which allows possible dependence on observed val-
ues of the potential outcomes, Yobs defined by (2.1), such as in a sequential
experiment:
Pr(W |X,Y (0), Y (1)) = Pr(W |X,Yobs).
But until Rubin (1975), randomized experiments were not defined us-
ing (2.3) and (2.4), which explicitly show such experiments’ freedom from
any dependence on observed or missing potential outcomes. Instead, ran-
domized experiments were described in such a way that the assignments
only depended on available covariates, and so implicitly did not involve
the potential outcomes themselves. But explicit mathematical notation, like
Neyman’s, can be a major advance over implicit descriptions.
Other special versions of assignment mechanisms were also discussed prior
to Rubin (1975, 1978), but without the benefit of explicit equations for the
assignment mechanism showing possible dependence on the potential out-
comes. For example, in economics, Roy (1951) described, without equations
or notation, “self-optimizing” behavior where each unit chooses the treat-
ment with the optimal outcome. And another well-known example from
economics is Haavelmo’s (1944) formulation of supply and demand behav-
ior. But these and other formulations in economics and elsewhere did not
use the notation of an assignment mechanism, nor did they have methods of
statistical inference for causal effects based on the assignment mechanism.
Instead, “regression” models were used to predict Yobs,i from Xi and Wi,
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with possible restrictions on some regression coefficients and/or on “error”
terms. In these models certain regression coefficients (e.g., for Wi or for in-
teractions with Wi) were interpreted as causal effects; analogous approaches
were used in other social sciences, as well as in epidemiology and medical
research, and are still common. Such regression models were and are based
on combined assumptions about the assignment mechanism and about the
science, which were typically only vaguely explicated because they often
were stated through restrictions on error terms, and therefore could, and
sometimes did, lead to mistakes.
Inferential methods based only on the assumption of a randomized assign-
ment mechanism were proposed by Fisher (1925) and described by Neyman
(1923) and further developed by others [see Rubin (1990a) for some ref-
erences]. The existence of these assignment-based methods, and their suc-
cess in practice, documents that the model for the assignment mechanism
is more fundamental for inference for causal effects than a model for the
science. These methods lead to concepts such as unbiased estimation and
asymptotic confidence intervals (due to Neyman), and p-values or signifi-
cance levels for sharp null hypotheses (due to Fisher), all defined by the
distribution of statistics (e.g., the difference of treatment and control sam-
ple means) induced by the assignment mechanism. In some contexts, such
as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s approval of a new drug, such
assignment mechanism-based analyses are considered the gold standard for
confirmatory inferences.
The third and final part of the RCM is optional; it involves specifying a full
probability model for the science, the quantity being conditioned on in the
assignment mechanism (2.2), and therefore treated as fixed in assignment-
based approaches. This approach is Bayesian, and was developed by Ru-
bin (1975, 1978) and further developed, for example, in Imbens and Rubin
(1997) and in many other places. This can, in special simple cases, lead to
the use of standard models, such as ordinary least squares regression mod-
els, but such models are generally not relevant to the design of observational
studies.
Of course, there are other frameworks for causal inference besides mine,
including ones where models have some relevance, but that is not the topic
or focus of this article. The reader interested in various uses of models on
the science (X,Y (0), Y (1)) can examine the text by Morgan and Winship
(2007), which provides a fairly comprehensive discussion of different ap-
proaches. Also informative, but with an applied and prescriptive attitude,
including some advice on design issues, is the text by Shadish, Cook and
Campbell (2002).
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3. Design observational studies to approximate randomized trials—gener-
al advice.
3.1. Overview. A crucial idea when trying to estimate causal effects from
an observational dataset is to conceptualize the observational dataset as hav-
ing arisen from a complex randomized experiment, where the rules used to
assign the treatment conditions have been lost and must be reconstructed.
There are various steps that I consider essential for designing an objective
observational study. These will be described in this section and then illus-
trated in the remaining parts of this article. In practice, the steps are not
always conducted in the order given below, but often they are, especially
when facing a particular candidate data set.
3.2. What was the hypothetical randomized experiment that led to the
observed dataset? As a consequence of our conceptualization of an observa-
tional study’s data as having arisen from a hypothetical randomized experi-
ment, the first activity is to think hard about that hypothetical experiment.
To start, what exactly were the treatment conditions and what exactly were
the outcome (or response) variables? Be aware that a particular observa-
tional dataset can often be conceptualized as having arisen from a variety of
different hypothetical experiments with differing treatment and control con-
ditions and possibly differing outcome variables. For example, a dataset with
copious measurements of humans’ prenatal exposures to exogenous agents,
such as hormones or barbiturates [e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985),
Reinisch et al. (1995)], could be proposed to have arisen from a random-
ized experiment on prenatal hormone exposure, or a randomized experiment
on prenatal barbiturate exposure, or a randomized factorial experiment on
both hormone and barbiturate exposure. But the investigator must be clear
about the hypothetical experiment that is to be approximated by the ob-
servational data at hand. Running regression programs is no substitute for
careful thinking, and providing tables summarizing computer output is no
substitute for precise writing and careful interpretation.
3.3. Are sample sizes in the dataset adequate? If the step presented in
Section 3.1 is successful in the limited sense that measurements of both
treatment conditions and outcomes seem to be available or obtainable from
descriptions of the observational dataset, the next step is to decide whether
the sample sizes in this dataset are large enough to learn anything of interest.
Here is where traditional power calculations are relevant; also extensions, for
example, involving the ratios of sample sizes needed to obtain well-matched
samples [Rubin (1976b), Section 5], are relevant, and should be considered
before plunging ahead. Sometimes, the sample sizes will be small, but the
data set is the only one available to address an important question. In such
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a case, it is legitimate to proceed, but efforts to create better data should
be initiated.
If the available samples appear adequate, then the next step is to strip
any final outcome measurements from the dataset. When designing a ran-
domized experiment, we cannot look at any outcome measurements before
doing the design, and this crucial feature of randomized experiments can be,
and I believe must be, implemented when designing observational studies—
outcome-free design is absolutely critical for objectivity. This point was made
very strongly in Rubin (2007), but somewhat surprisingly, it was not empha-
sized much in older work, for example, in Cochran’s work on observational
studies as reviewed in Rubin (1984), or even in most of my subsequent work
on matching summarized in Rubin (2006) prior to the mid-1990s. But I now
firmly believe that it is critical to hide all outcome data until the design
phase is complete. A subtlety here concerns “intermediate outcome data”
discussed in Section 5, such as compliance measurements.
3.4. Who are the decision makers for treatment assignment and what mea-
surements were available to them? The next step is to think very carefully
about why some units (e.g., medical patients) received the active treatment
condition (e.g., surgery) versus the control treatment condition (e.g., no
surgery): Who were the decision makers and what rules did they use? In a
randomized experiment, the randomized decision rules are explicitly written
down (hopefully), and in any subsequent publication, the rules are likewise
typically explicitly described. But with an observational study, we have to
work much harder to describe and justify the hypothetical approximating
randomized assignment mechanism. In common practice with observational
data, however, this step is ignored, and replaced by descriptions of the re-
gression programs used, which is entirely inadequate. What is needed is a
description of critical information in the hypothetical randomized experi-
ment and how it corresponds to the observed data.
For example, what were the background variables measured on the ex-
perimental units that were available to those making treatment decisions,
whether observed in the current dataset or not? These variables will be
called the “key covariates” for this study. Was there more than one decision
maker, and if so, is it plausible that all decision makers used the same rule,
or nearly so, to make their treatment decisions? If not, in what ways did the
decision rules possibly vary? It is remarkable to me that so many published
observational studies are totally silent on how the authors think that treat-
ment conditions were assigned, yet this is the single most crucial feature
that makes their observational studies inferior to randomized experiments.
3.5. Are key covariates measured well? Next, consider the existence and
quality of the key covariates’ measurements. If the key covariates are very
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poorly measured, or not even available in the dataset being examined, it
is typically a wise choice to look elsewhere for data to use to study the
causal question at hand. Sometimes surrogate variables can be found that
are known to be highly correlated with unmeasured key covariates and can
proxy for them. But no amount of fancy analysis can salvage an inadequate
data base unless there is substantial scientific knowledge to support heroic
assumptions. This is a lesson that many researchers seem to have difficulty
learning. Often the dataset being used is so obviously deficient with respect
to key covariates that it seems as if the researcher was committed to using
that dataset no matter how deficient. And interactions and nonlinear terms
should not be forgotten when considering covariates that may be key; for
example, the assignment rules for medical treatments could differ for those
with and without medical insurance.
3.6. Can balance be achieved on key covariates? The next step is to try
to find subgroups (subclasses, or matched pairs) of treated and control units
such that within a subgroup, the treated and control units appear to be bal-
anced with respect to their distributions of key covariates. That is, within
such a subgroup, the treated and control units should look as if they could
have been randomly divided (usually not with equal probability) into treat-
ment and control conditions. Often, it will not be possible to achieve such
balance in an entirely satisfactory way. In that situation, we may have to
restrict inferences to a subpopulation of units where such balance can be
achieved, or we may even decide that with this dataset we cannot achieve
balance with enough units to make the study worthwhile. If so, we should
usually forgo using this dataset to address the causal question being con-
sidered. A related issue is that if there appear to be many decision makers
using differing rules (e.g., different hospitals with different rules for when to
give a more expensive drug rather than a generic version), then achieving
this balance will be more difficult because different efforts to create balance
will be required for the differing decision makers. This point will be clearer
in the context of particular examples.
3.7. The result. These six steps combine to make for objective observa-
tional study design in the sense that the resultant designed study can be con-
ceptualized as a hypothetical, approximating randomized block (or paired
comparison) experiment, whose blocks (or matched pairs) are our balancing
groups, and where the probabilities of treatment versus control assignment
may vary relatively dramatically across the blocks. This statement does not
mean the researcher who follows these steps will achieve an answer similar
to the one that would have been found in the analogous randomized experi-
ment, but at least the observational study has a chance of doing so, whereas
12 D. B. RUBIN
if these steps are not followed, I believe that it is only blind luck that could
lead to a similar answer as in the analogous randomized experiment.
Sometimes the design effort can be so extensive that a description of it,
with no analyses of any outcome data, can be itself publishable. For a specific
example on peer influence on smoking behaviors, see Langenskold and Rubin
(2008).
4. Examples using propensity scores and subclassification.
4.1. Classic example with one observed covariate. The following very
simple example is taken from Cochran (1968) classic article on subclassi-
fication in observational studies, which uses some smoking data to illustrate
ideas. Let us suppose that we want to compare death rates (the outcome
variable of primary interest) among smoking males in the U.S., where the
treatment condition is considered cigarette smoking and the control condi-
tion is cigar and pipe smoking. There exists a very large dataset with the
death rates of smoking males in the U.S., and it distinguishes between these
two types of smokers. So far, so good, in that we have a dataset with Y and
treatment indicators, and it is very large. Now we strip this dataset of all
outcome data; no survival (i.e., Y ) data are left and are held out of sight
until the design phase is complete.
Next we ask (in a simple minded way, because this is only an illustrative
example), who is the decision maker for treatment versus control, and what
are the key covariates used to make this decision? It is relatively obvious that
the main decision maker is the individual male smoker. It is also relatively
obvious that the dominant covariate used to make this decision is age—
most smokers start in their teens, and most start by smoking cigarettes, not
pipes or cigars. Some pipe and cigar smokers start in college, but many start
later in life. Cigarette smokers tend to have a more uniform distribution of
ages. Other possible candidate key covariates are education, socio-economic
status, occupational status, income, and so forth, all of which tend to be
correlated with age, so to illustrate, we focus on age as our only X variable.
Then our hypothetical randomized experiment starts with male smokers and
randomly assigns them to cigarette or cigar/pipe smoking, where the propen-
sity to be a cigarette smoker rather than a cigar/pipe smoker is viewed as a
function of age. In this dataset, age is very well-measured. When we compare
the age distribution of cigarette smokers and age distribution of cigar/pipe
smokers in the U.S. in this dataset, we see that the former are younger, but
that there is substantial overlap in the distributions. Before moving on to
the next step, we should worry about how people in the hypothetical ex-
periment who died prior to the assembling of the observational dataset are
represented, but, for simplicity in this illustrative example, we will move on
to the next step.
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How do we create subgroups of treatment and control males with more
similar distributions of age than is seen overall, in fact, so similar that we
could believe that the data arose from a randomized block experiment?
Cochran’s example used subclassification. First, the smokers are divided at
the overall median into young smokers and old smokers—two subclasses, and
then divided into young, middle aged, and old smokers, each of these three
subclasses being equal size, and so forth. Finally, nine subclasses are used.
The age distributions within each of the nine subclasses are very similar
for the treatment condition and the control condition, just as if the men
had been randomly assigned within the age subclasses to treatment and
control, because there is such a narrow range of ages within each of the
nine subclasses. And of great importance, there do exist both treatment
and control males in each of nine subclasses.
The design phase can be considered complete for our simple illustrative
example. Our underlying hypothetical randomized experiment that led to
the observed dataset is a randomized block experiment with nine blocks
defined by age, where the probability of being assigned to the treatment
condition (cigarette smoking) rather than the control condition (cigar/pipe
smoking) decreases with age. We are now allowed to look at the outcome
data within each subclass and compare treatment and control death rates.
We find that, averaging over the nine blocks (subclasses), the death rates are
about 50% greater for the cigarette smokers than the cigar and pipe smokers.
Incidentally, the full data set with no subclassification leads to nearly the
opposite conclusion; see Cochran (1968) or Rubin (1997) for details.
But what would have happened if we decided that we wanted to subclas-
sify also on education, socio-economic status, and income, each covariate
using, let’s say, five levels [a minimum number implicitly recommended in
Cochran (1968)]? There would be four key covariates, each with five lev-
els, yielding a total of 625 subclasses. And many observational studies have
many more than four key covariates that are known to be used for making
treatment decisions. For example, with 20 such covariates, even if each is
dichotomous, there are 220 subclasses—greater than a million, and as a re-
sult, many subclasses would probably have only one unit, either a treated
or control, with no treatment-control comparison possible. How should we
design this step of observational studies in such more realistic situations?
4.2. Propensity score methodology. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) pro-
posed a class of methods to try to achieve balance in observational studies
when there are many key covariates present. In recent years there has been
an explosion of work on and interest in these methods; the Introduction in
Rubin (2006) offers some references. Sadly, many of the articles that use
propensity score methods do not use them correctly to help design observa-
tional studies according to the guidelines in Section 3, which are motivated
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by the theoretical perspective of Section 2 and illustrated in the trivial one-
covariate example of Section 4.1. Rather, these inappropriate applications,
for example, use the outcome data to help choose propensity score models,
and use the propensity score only as a predictor in a regression model with
the outcome, Yobs, as the dependent variable.
The propensity score is the observational study analogue of complete ran-
domization in a randomized experiment in the sense that its use is not
intended to increase precision but only to eliminate systematic biases in
treatment-control comparisons. In some cases, however, its use can increase
precision; for the reason, see Rubin and Thomas (1992). As we have seen in
earlier sections, it is formally defined as the probability of a unit receiving
the treatment condition, rather than the control condition, as a function of
observed covariates, including indicator variables for the individual decision
makers and associated interactions, if needed. The propensity score is rarely
known in an observational study, and therefore must be estimated, typically
using a model such as logistic regression, but this choice, although common,
is by no means mandatory or even ideal in many circumstances. The critical
aspect of the propensity score is that it models the reasons for treatment
versus control assignment at the level of the decision maker. For instance, in
the context of the expanded tobacco example of Section 4.1, it could model
the choice of a male smoker to smoke cigarettes versus cigars or pipes as
a function of age, income, education, SES, etc. Once estimated, the linear
version of it (e.g., the beta times X in the logistic regression) can be treated
as the only covariate, just like age in the example of Section 4.1, and it is
used to match or subclassify the treatment and control units.
But we are not done yet. We have to check that balance on all covari-
ates has been achieved. If the propensity score is correctly estimated and
there is balance on it, then Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that bal-
ance is achieved on all observed covariates. The achieved balance within
matched pairs or subclasses must be assessed and documented before the
design phase is finished. With only one covariate, balance on that covariate
is easily achieved (if it can be achieved) by using narrow enough subclasses
(or bins) of the covariate. With many covariates, the assessment and re-
estimation of propensity score to achieve balance can be tricky, and good
guidance for doing this is still being developed. When selecting matched
pairs, using both the propensity score and some prognostically important
functions of key covariates can often result in increased precision of estima-
tion [see Rubin (1979b), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), Rubin and Thomas
(2000)].
Here we illustrate these various ideas in the context of some real examples.
The next example concerns the relative success of two treatments for breast
cancer, and illustrates not only the process of selecting the key background
variables for use in the propensity score estimation, but also illustrates that
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careful observational studies can (not necessarily will) reach the same general
conclusions as expensive randomized experiments. The second example is
from a large marketing study and displays the kind of balance that can
be achieved following propensity score subclassification, as well as the fact
that some units can be unmatchable. The last example, in Section 5, uses
a data set on large volume versus small volume hospitals to emphasize that
one observational data set can be used to support two (or more) differing
templates for the underlying randomized study of a particular question, and
one template may be considered far better than the other.
4.3. GAO study of treatments for breast cancer. The following example
appeared in a Government Accounting Office (GAO) publication that was
summarized in Rubin (1997). In the 1960s mastectomy was the standard
treatment for many forms of breast cancer, but there was growing interest
in the possibility that for a class of less severe situations (e.g., small tumors,
node negative) a more limited surgery, which just removed the tumor, might
be just as successful as the more radical and disfiguring operation.
Several large and expensive randomized trials were done for this category
of women with less severe cancer, and the results of these trials are summa-
rized in Table 1. As can be seen there, these studies suggest that for this
class of women who are willing to participate in a randomized experiment,
and for these cancer treating centers and their doctors, who are also willing
Table 1
Estimated 5-year survival rates for nodenegative patients in six randomized clinical trials
Estimated Estimated
survival survival
rate for rate for Estimated
Study Women Women women women causal effect
Breast
conservation Mastectomy
Study (BC) (Mas) BC Mas BC–Mas
Study n n % % %
U.S.–NCI† 74 67 93.9 94.7 −0.8
Milanese† 257 263 93.5 93.0 0.5
French† 59 62 94.9 96.2 −1.3
Danish‡ 289 288 87.4 85.9 1.5
EORTC‡ 238 237 89.0 90.0 −1.0
U.S.–NSABP‡ 330 309 89.0 88.0 1.0
† Single-center trial; ‡ Multicenter trial.
Reference: Rubin, D. B. Estimated causal effects from large datasets using propensity
scores. Annals of Internal Medicine (1997); 127, 8(II):757–763.
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to participate, the five-year survival rate appears to be very similar in the
two randomized treatment conditions. There is, however, an indication from
Table 1 that the survival is better overall in the trials conducted in single
centers (the top three rows) than in the multi-center trials (the bottom three
rows), possibly because of more specialized care, including after care.
The reason this last comment is relevant is that based on these results,
the U.S. National Cancer Institute felt that for this category of women, the
recommendation for general practice should be to have breast conserving
operations rather than the radical version. The GAO was concerned that
this advice based on these randomized trials may not be wise for general
practice, where the surgeons involved may not be as skilled, after care may
be lower quality, the women themselves may be less research-oriented and
therefore less medically astute about their own care, and so forth, than
in the randomized trials. It was not possible to initiate a new randomized
trial in the general population of women and doctors who may not want to
be randomized; even if it were, the funding, planning, implementing, etc.,
would take too long and results concerning five-year survival would be first
available a decade in the future.
Consequently, the GAO implemented an observational study using the
SEER (Surveillance, Epidemiology, End Results) data base, which has rela-
tively complete information on all cancer cases in certain catchment areas.
Importantly, it had detailed information on the kind and diagnosed severity
of the cancer, so that they could use the same exclusion criteria as the ran-
domized experiments, and it had the kind of treatment used by the surgical
team; also, it had survival information, which of course was the key outcome
variable. Moreover, it had many covariates. And it had about five thousand
breast cancer cases of the type studied in the six randomized experiments
during the relevant period, which was considered a large enough sample to
proceed.
So far so good. The outcome data were stripped from the files, and the
design phase proceeded. The following description is from an over 15 year old
memory, and no doubt is somewhat distorted by my current attitudes, but
is largely accurate, I believe. The GAO checked with a variety of physicians
about who the decision makers were for choice of surgery for this category
of women. The replies were that they were usually joint choices made by
the surgeon and woman, sometimes with input from the husband or other
family members or friends. Some of the key covariates were obvious, such
as the size of the tumor and the woman’s age and marital status. Others
were less obvious, such as urbanization, region of the country, year, race,
and various interactions (e.g., age by marital status). In any case, a list
of approximately twenty key covariates was assembled, and it turned out
that all had been collected in SEER. More good news. Then the consistency
of the decision makers’ rules across the dataset was considered, although
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at the time, not as seriously as I would do it now. It was decided that
the way women and doctors used the key covariates was pretty much the
same around the country, and any differences were probably captured by
the observed covariates.
Propensity scores were estimated by logistic regression, and they were
used to create five subclasses of treatment/control women. The women were
ranked by their estimated propensity scores, and the lowest 20% formed sub-
class 1, the next 20% formed subclass 2, etc. Within each subclass, balance
was checked, not only on the covariates included in the propensity score, but
also on all other important covariates in the database. For example, the av-
erage age of a treated women within each subclass should be approximately
the same as the average age of a control women in that subclass, and the pro-
portion of each that are married should also be as similar as if the treatment
and control women in that subclass had been randomly divided (obviously,
not with equal probability across the subclasses). When less balance was
found on a key covariate within a subclass than would have occurred in a
randomized experiment, terms were added to the propensity score model and
balance was reassessed. Unfortunately, those tables and the processes never
survived into the final report, but such balance was achieved—not perfectly,
but close enough to believe in the hypothetical underlying randomized block
experiment that led to the observed data.
The results of the subclassification on the propensity score are summa-
rized in Table 2. In general, this observational study’s results are consistent
with those from the randomized trials. There is essentially no evidence for
any advantage to the radical operation, except possibly in those propensity
score subclasses where the women and doctors were more likely to select
Table 2
Estimated 5-year survival rates for node-negative patients in SEER data base within each
of five propensity score subclasses: from tables in U.S. GAO Report [General Accounting
Office (1994)]
Propensity score
subclass Treatment condition n Estimate
1 Brest conservation 56 85.6%
Mastectomy 1008 86.7%
2 Brest conservation 106 82.8%
Mastectomy 964 83.4%
3 Brest conservation 193 85.2%
Mastectomy 866 88.8%
4 Brest conservation 289 88.7%
Mastectomy 978 87.3%
5 Brest conservation 462 89.0%
Mastectomy 604 88.5%
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mastectomy (subclasses 1, 2, 3), but the data are certainly not definitive.
Similarly, for the women and doctors relatively more likely to select breast
conserving operations, there is some slight evidence of a survival benefit to
that choice. If we believed that the treatment effect should be the same for
all women in the study, these changing results across propensity subclasses
could be viewed as evidence of a confounded and nonignorable treatment as-
signment (i.e., an omitted key covariate). Overall, however, there appears to
be no advantage to recommending one treatment over the other. It is inter-
esting to note that, consistent with expectations, the overall survival rates
in the observational dataset are not as good as those in the more specialized
centers represented in Table 1.
4.4. Marketing example. Propensity score methods, like randomization,
work best in large samples. For a trivial example, if we have one man and
one woman, one to be treated and one to be control, randomized treatment
assignment in expectation would create a half-man treated and half-woman
control, but in reality the man would be either treated or control and the
woman would be in the other condition. With a hundred men and a hundred
women, we would expect roughly half of each to be in each treatment arm.
Analogously, with propensity scores, the creation of narrow subclasses or
matched pairs should create balanced distributions in expectation, which
should be easier to achieve and to assess in large samples than in small
ones.
The next example, from Rubin and Waterman (2006), illustrates this fea-
ture well because the sample sizes are large: 100,000 treated doctors and
150,000 control doctors. “Treated” here means visited by a sales representa-
tive (rep) at least once during a certain six month period; the sales rep tells
the doctor the details of a new weight-loss drug being promoted by a phar-
maceutical company. The control doctors are not visited by a sales rep from
that company during that period. The treatment/control indicator variables
come from the companies’ records as provided by the sales reps. The key
outcome variable is the number of prescriptions (scripts) of this drug written
by the doctor during the following six months; this information on scripts is
obtained several months later from a third party vendor, which is updated at
regular intervals. The previous version of this data source and other sources
have all sorts of background information on the doctors, such as sex, race,
age, years since degree, size of practice, medical specialty, number of scripts
written in prior years for the same class of drugs as being described by the
sales rep, etc. In fact, there are well over 100 basic covariates available. The
objective of the observational study is to estimate the causal effects of the
reps visiting these doctors. It costs money to pay the sales reps’ salaries to
visit the doctors, and moreover, many reps get commissions based, in part,
on the number of scripts written by the doctors they visited for the detailed
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Fig. 1. Histograms for background variable: prior Rx score (0–100) at baseline.
drug. Do the visits cause more scripts to be written, and if so, which doc-
tors should be visited with higher priority? Both of these, and other similar
questions, are causal ones.
The decision-maker for visiting or not the doctors is essentially the sales
rep, and these folks, rather obviously, like to visit doctors who prescribe a lot,
who have large practices, are in a specialty that prescribes a lot of the type
of drug being detailed, etc. Essentially all of these background variables, X ,
and more, are available on the purchased data set, which has huge sample
sizes; the company has the indicator W for visited versus not, and next
Fig. 2. Histograms for background variable: specialty.
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year’s purchased data set will have the outcome variables Y on the actual
number of scripts written by these doctors in the next time period. So things
look in good shape to estimate and re-estimate the propensity scores until
we achieve balanced distributions within subclasses, or we decide that there
are some types of doctors who have essentially no chance of being visited or
not being visited, and then no estimation of causal effects will be attempted
for them.
Figures 1 and 2 display the initial balance for two important covariates,
number of prior scripts written in the previous year (for drugs in the same
class as the detailed drug) on a scale from 0 (minimum) to 100 (the arbitrar-
ily scaled maximum), and the specialty. These figures reveal quite dramatic
differences between the doctors who were visited and those who were not
visited. It is not surprising that the visited doctors were the ones who wrote
many more prescriptions (per doctor) than the not visited doctors. But the
visited doctors also have a different distribution of specialties than the not
visited doctors. For example, ob-gyn doctors are visited relatively less often
than doctors with other specialties; presumably, ob-gyn doctors do not pre-
scribe weight-loss drugs for their pregnant patients, and the sales reps use
this information.
Propensity scores were estimated by logistic regression based on various
functions of all of the covariates. Figure 3 displays the histograms for the
estimated linear propensity scores (the βˆX in the logistic regression) among
the not visited and visited doctors. These histograms are shown with 15
subclasses (or bins) of propensity scores. In some bins, there are only visited
doctors, that is, in the bins with linear propensity scores larger than 1.0; in
those two bins, there are no doctors who were not visited. Presumably, they
are high prescribing doctors with large practices, etc. No causal inferences
are possible for them without making model-based assumptions relating
outcomes to covariates for which there are no data to assess the underlying
assumptions. Similarly, for the four lowest bins of propensity, with linear
scores less than 0.1, all doctors are not visited, and so, similarly, no causal
inferences about the effect of visiting this type of doctor are possible unless
based on unassessable assumptions.
But in the other nine bins, there are both visited and not visited doctors,
and the claim is that within each of those bins, the distributions of all
covariates that entered the propensity score estimation will be nearly the
same for the visited and not visited doctors. To be specific, let us examine
the bin between 0.5 and <0.6. Figures 4 and 5 show the distributions of prior
number of prescriptions and specialties in this bin for the not visited and
visited doctors. These distributions are strikingly more similar than their
counterparts shown in Figures 1 and 2. In fact, they are so similar that
one could believe that, within that bin, the visited doctors are a random
sample from all doctors in that bin. And the claim is that this will hold (in
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expectation) for all covariates used to estimate the propensity score and in
all bins where there are both visited and not visited doctors.
The process of assessing balance was conducted for all variables and all
bins and considered adequate in the sense that it was considered plausible
Fig. 3. Histograms for summarized background variables: linear propensity score.
Fig. 4. Histograms for a variable in a subclass of propensity scores: prior Rx score.
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that a randomized block experiment had become reconstructed, except for
the bins with only visited or not visited doctors. Admittedly, there is an
aspect of “art” operating here, in that random imbalance of prognostically
important covariates (i.e., ones thought to be strongly related to outcome
variables) was considered more important to correct than more extreme im-
balance in prognostically unimportant ones, but the field of statistics will al-
ways benefit from scientifically informed thought. Nevertheless, better guid-
ance on how to conduct this process more systematically is needed, and is
in development; see, for example, Imbens and Rubin [(2008b), Chapters 13
and 14].
In any case the design phase was complete, except for the specification of
model-based adjustments to be made within the bins, and the more detailed
analyses used to rank doctors by priority to visit. Readers interested in the
conclusions, which are a bit surprising, should check Rubin and Waterman
(2006).
5. A principal stratification example.
5.1. The causal effect of being treated in large volume versus small volume
hospitals. The third example illustrates the point that the design phase
in some observational studies may involve conceptualizing the hypothetical
underlying randomized experiment that lead to the observed data as being
more complex than a randomized block or randomized paired comparison.
In particular, in some situations, we may have to view the hypothetical ex-
periment as being a randomized block with noncompliance to the assigned
treatment, a so-called “encouragement” design [Holland (1988)]. In many
Fig. 5. Histograms for a variable in a subclass of propensity scores: specialty.
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settings with human subjects, even an essentially perfectly designed random-
ized experiment only randomly assigns the encouragement to take treatment
or control because we cannot force people to take one or the other. In the
context of a perfectly double-blind experiment, where the subjects have no
idea whether they are getting treatment or control, there will be no differ-
ence in compliance rates between the treatment versus control groups, but
there are often side effects that create different levels of compliance in the
conditions [Jin and Rubin (2008)]. In such cases, the ideas behind “instru-
mental variables” methods [Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)] as general-
ized to “principal stratification” [Frangakis and Rubin (2002)] can be very
useful.
5.2. Propensity score subclassification for diagnosing hospital type. We
illustrate this design using a small observational data set from the Karolinska
Institute in Stockholm, Sweden. Interest focuses on the treatment of cardia
cancer patients in Central and Northern Sweden, and whether it is better for
these patients to be treated in a large or small volume hospital, where volume
is defined by the number of patients with that type of cancer treated in recent
years. The data set has 158 cardia cancer patients diagnosed between 1988
and 1995, 79 diagnosed at large volume hospitals, defined as treating more
than ten patients with cardia cancer during that period, and 79 diagnosed
at the remaining small volume hospitals. These sample sizes are small, but
the data set is the only one currently available in Sweden to study this
important question.
Generally, the commonly held view is that being treated in a large vol-
ume hospital is better, but the opposite argument could be made when the
large volume treating hospital is far from a support system of family and
friends, which presumably may be more available in small volume hospitals.
The most critical policy issue concerns whether the cardia cancer treatment
centers at small volume hospitals can be closed without having a deleterious
effect on patient survival. If so, resources could be saved because patients
diagnosed at small volume hospitals could be transferred to large volume
treating hospitals, and if it is true that large volume cardia cancer treat-
ment centers offer better survival outcomes, then the small volume ones
should arguably be closed in any case. Our data set has hospital volume and
patient survival information in it.
Because of the uniform training of doctors under the socialized medi-
cal system in Sweden, the assignment of large versus small “home hospital
type,” where the cancer was diagnosed, was considered by medical experts
to be unconfounded, that is, essentially assigned at random within levels
of measured covariates, X : age at diagnosis, date of diagnosis, sex of pa-
tient and urbanization. The decision maker is the individual patient, so our
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Fig. 6. Cardia cancer, number of people, subclassified by propensity score.
dataset seems well-suited for studying the causal effect of home hospital type
on survival.
Propensity score analyses were done to predict diagnosing (home) hospital
type from X , including nonlinear terms in X . It was decided that the age
of patient should be limited to between 35 and 84 because the two patients
under 35 (actually both under 30) were both diagnosed in large volume
hospitals, and longer term survival in the 8 cardia cancer patients 85 and over
was considered unlikely no matter where treated, and would therefore simply
add noise to the survival data. Propensity score analyses on the remaining
148 patients led to five subclasses; these are summarized in Figures 6–8 are
“Love plots” [Ahmed et al. (2006)] summarizing balance before and after
this subclassification, for binary and continuous covariates, respectively.
5.3. Treating hospital type versus home hospital type. If patients were al-
ways treated in the same hospital where they were diagnosed, estimating the
causal effects of hospital type would now be easy because of the assumed
unconfounded assignment of diagnosing hospital type. However, there are
transfers between hospital types, typically from small to large—33 of the
75 diagnoised in a small hospital transferred to a large one for treatment,
but sometimes from large to small—2 of 75 transferred this direction. The
reasons for these transfers are considered quite complex. The decisions are
made by the individual patient, but clearly with input from doctors, rela-
tives, and friends, where the issues being discussed include speculation about
FOR OBJECTIVE CAUSAL INFERENCE, DESIGN TRUMPS ANALYSIS 25
the probability of success of the treatment at one versus the other, the pa-
tient’s willingness to tolerate invasive operations, the importance of being
close to relatives and friends, and a host of other reasons. Consequently,
there is no doubt that given the observed covariates and the home hospi-
tal type, the assignment of treating hospital type is confounded. Therefore,
doing a direct analysis of treating hospital type, even if propensity score
methods were used to create subclasses of patients with identical distribu-
tions of all observed covariates in large and small treating hospitals, would
be considered unsatisfactory because key covariates were not available in the
data set.
We can, however, still make progress based on the assumed unconfounded
assignment of home hospital type by using a different template for our ob-
servational study of treating hospital type: a randomized experiment with
noncompliance. That is, think of patients who transfer, or, more generally,
who would have transferred if assigned to a different hospital type, as being
noncompliers, and therefore, our template is that of a randomized encour-
agement design, where the encouragement to be treated in the diagnosing
large or small hospital is randomly assigned within propensity score strata.
The crucial idea here is then to stratify also on the bivariate “intermedi-
ate outcome,” treating hospital when assigned to a large home hospital and
treating hospital when assigned to a small home hospital. Even though only
one of these intermediate variables is actually observed, progress can still be
made. Notice that the design phase does here look at intermediate outcome
Fig. 7. Cardia cancer, difference in means for binary covariates and pscore.
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Fig. 8. Cardia cancer, t-statistics for continuous covariates.
Table 3
Cardia cancer: observed counts in observed groups and approximate counts in principal
strata under monotonicity assumption—subclass 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Assigned”/
randomized
Underlying
Approximate
proportion in
population in
principal
strata
Approximate
N in LS
principal
stratum
Treating
hospital
type T
principal
home hospital type strata: h =
h # # ℓ s
(1)
ℓ 5
L 5
L L 44%
L S 56% 3
(2) S 0 S S 0%
(3)
s 25
L 11
L L 44%
S S 0%
(4) S 14 L S 56% 14
data, treating hospital type, but not the outcome data on survival, on which
decisions will be based. Survival data are not available at this stage!
Denote the home hospital type by h, which takes the value ℓ when as-
signed large hospital type and s when assigned small home hospital type.
Similarly, let T denote treating hospital type, which takes the value L when
the treating hospital is large, and takes the value S when treating hospital is
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small. The first three columns of Tables 3–7 summarize the observed values
of h and T within each of the five propensity score subclasses. Clearly, in all
subclasses, transfers into large hospitals are common, but only in subclass 5
are there any ℓ→ S transfers. But do we estimate that there are compliers,
who are treated in both large and small treating hospital types, within each
subclass? If not, we will not be able to estimate the causal effect of treating
hospital type for the entire group of patients—a critical design issue with
this template.
Table 4
Cardia cancer: observed counts in observed groups and approximate counts in principal
strata under monotonicity assumption—subclass 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Assigned”/
randomized
Underlying
Approximate
proportion in
population in
principal
strata
Approximate
N in LS
principal
stratum
Treating
hospital
type T
principal
home hospital type strata: h =
h # # ℓ s
(1)
ℓ 12
L 12
L L 71%
L S 29% 3
(2) S 0 S S 0%
(3)
s 17
L 12
L L 71%
S S 0%
(4) S 5 L S 29% 5
Table 5
Cardia cancer: observed counts in observed groups and approximate counts in principal
strata under monotonicity assumption—subclass 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Assigned”/
randomized
Underlying
Approximate
proportion in
population in
principal
strata
Approximate
N in LS
principal
stratum
Treating
hospital
type T
principal
home hospital type strata: h =
h # # ℓ s
(1)
ℓ 17
L 17
L L 38%
L S 62% 11
(2) S 0 S S 0%
(3)
s 13
L 5
L L 38%
S S 0%
(4) S 8 L S 62% 8
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5.4. Principal strata and the monotonicity assumption. Formally in the
RCM, there are two types of outcomes: (1) the treating hospital type, T ,
which equals T (ℓ) when h = ℓ and T (s) when h = s, and (2) the survival
time since diagnosis, Y , which equals Y (ℓ) when h= ℓ and Y (s) when h= s.
The possible values of (T (ℓ), T (s)) will be denoted LL,LS ,SL, or SS [where,
for simplicity, LL means the same as (L,L), etc.], and those values define
four possible “principal strata.” LS can be thought of as the stratum of
compliers, that is, nontransfer patients; the LL and SS strata can be thought
of as noncompliers who will always be treated at the same hospital type no
Table 6
Cardia cancer: observed counts in observed groups and approximate counts in principal
strata under monotonicity assumption—subclass 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Assigned”/
randomized
Underlying
Approximate
proportion in
population in
principal
strata
Approximate
N in LS
principal
stratum
Treating
hospital
type T
principal
home hospital type strata: h =
h # # ℓ s
(1)
ℓ 19
L 19
L L 55%
L S 45% 9
(2) S 0 S S 0%
(3)
s 11
L 6
L L 55%
S S 0%
(4) S 5 L S 45% 5
Table 7
Cardia cancer: observed counts in observed groups and approximate counts in principal
strata under monotonicity assumption—subclass 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Assigned”/
randomized
Underlying
Approximate
proportion in
population in
principal
strata
Approximate
N in LS
principal
stratum
Treating
hospital
type T
principal
home hospital type strata: h =
h # # ℓ s
(1)
ℓ 20
L 18
L L 67%
L S 23% 5
(2) S 2 S S 10%
(3)
s 9
L 6
L L 67%
S S 10%
(4) S 3 L S 23% 2
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matter where assigned, and SL can be thought of as defiers, who will transfer
no matter where assigned. The values of the principal strata are not affected
by assignment of home hospital type—which value [T (ℓ) or T (s)] is observed
is affected by treatment assignment, but the bivariate values are not, and
therefore (T (ℓ), T (s)) is, formerly, a partially observed covariate.
Now, we consider what is called the “monotonicity” assumption or the
“no-defier” assumption—that is, we assume that the SL principal stratum
is empty. In our setting, this assumption is very plausible, and because it
excludes the SL principal stratum, we have only three principal strata: LL,
LS and SS. Under this assumption, the possible principal strata for each
observed combination of home hospital type and treating hospital type in
each propensity subclass are shown in the fourth columns of Tables 3–7. The
observed ℓ→ S group (the second row in Tables 3–7) must be composed of
SS patients because they can be neither LL nor SL patients, respectively—
because they were assigned ℓ but treated in S and therefore are not LL
patients, and there are no SL patients by the monotonicity assumption.
Similarly, the observed s→ L group (the third row of Tables 3–7) must be
LL patients because they were assigned s but were treated in L.
In contrast, the observed ℓ→ L subgroup (the first row of Tables 3–7)
could be compliers, and so be in LS, or noncompliers who are members of
the LL principal stratum (who were assigned to home hospital type L, and
to which they would have transferred for their treating hospital type if they
were assigned to a small home hospital type). Hence, we split row 1 into two
sub-rows in the fourth column of Tables 3–7. Similarly, the observed s→ S
subgroups (the fourth row of Tables 3–7) could be compliers, and so be in
LS, or noncompliers who are members of the SS principal stratum, and so
is also split into two sub-rows.
We can approximate the proportion of patients in each principal stratum,
as shown in the fifth columns of Tables 3–7. More explicitly, from the second
row of Table 7, columns (1) and (3), we see that 2/20 are observed to be
ℓ→ S. Because of the assumed random assignment into ℓ and s within
propensity score subclasses, we have that approximately 10% of the patients
belong to the principal stratum SS, as shown in the fifth column of Table 7.
Similarly, from the third row of Table 7, columns (1) and (3), we infer that
approximately 6/9≈ 67% of patients belong to principal stratum LL in this
subclass, as shown in the fifth columns of Table 7.
Hence, we can approximate the fraction of compliers, the LS principal
stratum in this subclass, by simple subtraction: 100%− 10%− 67% = 23%.
The sixth column in Table 7 indicates the approximate number of LS pa-
tients in each of the four rows of observed patients. Analogous calculations
are summarized in Tables 3–6 for the other propensity score subclasses.
Even if we could perfectly identify all the LS patients, which we cannot,
the sample sizes are small, and so inference for the causal effect of treating
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hospital when it equals home hospital will be imprecise. Nevertheless, we
outline the planned analysis in Section 5.6 because these are the only data
available to study this question. Importantly, we anticipate that in each sub-
class there are some compliers who are treated in large volume hospitals and
some compliers who are treated in small volume hospitals.
5.5. ITT and CACE= ITTLS and their estimation. The average causal
effect of home hospital type on survival is the comparison of the potential
survival outcomes of all N patients under hi = ℓ and under hi = s,
ITT=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[Yi(ℓ)− Yi(s)],
where ITT is the Intention-To-Treat (ITT) effect of the assignment of large
versus small home hospital type. Under unconfounded assignment of home
hospital type, we are able to estimate ITT by taking the average observed
difference in Y for large volume hospital patients and small volume hospital
patients within each propensity subclass, weighting each subclass-specific
estimate by the total number in that subclass and averaging the estimates.
Because we are not examining survival outcome data at this design stage, we
cannot calculate these estimates, but we saw this approach in the breast can-
cer example of Section 4. In this problem using the template of a randomized
block experiment with noncompiliance, the estimation is more subtle.
When Gi = LS , the home hospital type equals the treating hospital type,
that is, hi = Ti. The causal effect of home hospital type in the LS principal
stratum is defined to be
CACE≡ ITTLS =
1
NLS
∑
i∈LS
(Yi(L)− Yi(S)),
whereNLS is the number of LS patients, and CACE means “Compliance Av-
erage Causal Effect” [Imbens and Rubin (1997)]. ITTLS can be interpreted
as either the intention-to-treat effect of home hospital type for complying pa-
tients or the intention-to-treat effect of treating hospital type for complying
patients, because for the LS principal stratum, hi = Ti. Under monotonicity,
the LS principal stratum is the only stratum of patients where we can learn
about the causal effects of treating hospital type because the patients in
the other principal strata, LL and SS, will always be exposed to the same
treating hospital type.
CACE is easily estimated once we identify the individuals in the LS stra-
tum, and we have not yet identified any particular member of the ℓ→ L or
s→ S rows (rows one and four) in Tables 3–7 as being in the LS prin-
cipal stratum, and so we cannot yet compare average outcomes in this
stratum. Nevertheless, we can find a unique method-of-moments estimate
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of the causal effects of assigned (= treating) hospital type within the LS
principal stratum under, what are considered, medically very justifiable as-
sumptions, which in general are called “exclusion restrictions.” The result-
ing estimator of CACE is known as the “instrumental variable estimate”
[Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)]. Better (e.g., Bayesian) methods of es-
timation exist [e.g., see Imbens and Rubin (1997)].
5.6. Exclusion restrictions. There are two exclusions restrictions. The
first exclusion restriction is for patients in the LL principal stratum. It
states that, for all i ∈ LL, Yi(ℓ) = Yi(s), that is, there is no effect on po-
tential outcomes Y of being assigned to a large (ℓ) versus small (s) home
hospital type for patient i ∈ LL. The medical justification for this restric-
tion is that patient i would be treated in a large hospital type (L) under
either assignment, and one’s medical outcome is considered a result of where
one is treated not where one is diagnosed. The exclusion restriction for pa-
tients in the SS principal stratum is analogous; for all i ∈ SS , Yi(ℓ) = Yi(s),
that is, for those patients who would be treated in a small hospital type
(S) whether assigned to l or s, there is no effect of assignment on the Y
potential outcomes.
Now, ITT for all patients can be written as
ITT= πLS ITTLS + πSS ITTSS + πLLITTLL,
where πLS , πSS and πLL are the fractions of the sample, and ITTLS , ITTSS
and ITTLL are the intention-to-treat effects in the LS, SS and LL strata,
respectively. Because the exclusion restrictions force ITTSS and ITTLL to
be identically zero, this equation becomes
ITT= πLS ITTLS ,
or
ITTLS = ITT/πLS .
Thus, the instrumental variables estimate of the ITT effect of treating
hospital among compliers is found by dividing the estimated ITT effect of
home hospital type by the estimated fraction of the sample in LS.
The planned analysis will use Bayesian versions of this estimator within
each propensity score subclass, and then average over all subclasses. An
initial Bayesian analysis that partially benefits from the propensity score
analysis presented here, but also involves data on stomach cancer patients,
is presented in Rubin et al. (2008).
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6. Discussion. This article advocates the position that observational stud-
ies for causal effects need to be designed to approximate randomized ex-
periments. This enterprise requires careful thought and execution, and not
simply running mindless regression programs and looking at coefficients. In
most situations, this design effort will be more intellectually demanding than
a similar effort for an analogous randomized experiment. Of critical impor-
tance, final outcome data cannot be used in design without compromising
the objectivity of the study design. Propensity score methods are extremely
helpful tools for reconstructing the underlying hypothetical experiment that
lead to the observed data. Sometimes, the hypothetical approximating ran-
domized experiment is one with complications, such as noncompliance, and
then the principal stratification framework can be extremely helpful. But
most important is for the worker in observational studies to stay focused on
approximating a plausible hypothetical underlying randomized experiment.
A final comment concerns the application of this perspective to actual
randomized experiments, especially those with covariates that have not
been used in the randomization (e.g., not used to create blocks). In such
cases, we would expect random imbalances in some covariates, and if there
is concern that these covariates may be related to outcomes, the applica-
tion of the techniques described here, with no access to final outcome data,
preserves the objectivity of the experiment, whereas model-based adjust-
ments, unless fully specified a priori, would compromise that objectivity.
This approach has been applied, for example, in a study of school vouchers
[Barnard et al. (2003)] and in a study of vertical disease transmission during
delivery [Zell et al. (2007)].
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